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Legislative Approaches to Marriage Penalty
Relief: The Unintended Effects of Change on the
Married Couple's Choice of Filing Status
Amy C. Christian*

I. INTRODUCTION

This Article arises out of my participation in a symposium
recorded in this issue of the New York Law School Journalof Human
Rights.' At that symposium I spoke about how recent legislative

efforts to reduce or eliminate the marriage penalty often have
unintended, and occasionally egregious, consequences. 2 The purpose
of this Article is to analyze, in further detail, the provisions of

marriage penalty relief proposals and to reveal some of those
unintended consequences.
The marriage penalty, as it is commonly conceived, is the
phenomenon in which a married couple's tax liability exceeds the
combined tax liabilities of two single people each earning the same
incomes as the spouses. The couple is essentially penalized for
marrying. 3 The marriage penalty results not from any one provision
Professor of Law, Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law;
B.S.B.A., Georgetown University, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1991.
1 See Symposium, Women, Equity and Federal Tax Policy: Open Questions,
16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 119(1999).
2 See Amy C. Christian, Unintended Consequences of Marriage Penalty
Relief: The Effect on the Married Couple's Choice of Filing Status, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 172 (1999).

3 See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 1389, 1429-31 (1975), for an excellent explanation of the marriage penalty; see also
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the
Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 94-96 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery,
Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40
UCLA L. REv. 983, 989-96 (1993); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriageand the Income Tax, 67
S. CAL. L. REv. 339, 358-65 (1994). See generally Tax Treatment of Married,Head of
Household, and Single Taxpayers: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 96th Cong. 231-320 (1980); Economic Problems of Women: Hearings Before the
Joint Econ. Comm., 93d Cong. 221-87, 604-09 (1973-1974); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 96th CONG., 2D SESS., THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES
AND SINGLE PERSONS 3-7 (Comm. Print 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR
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of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC" or "code"). Rather, numerous
code provisions contain characteristics that contribute to the marriage
penalty. 4 Furthermore, the marriage penalty was not enacted
purposefully, but arises incidentally from many causes, including the
mathematical impossibility for a tax system simultaneously to be
progressive, to treat equal-income couples equally, and to be marriage
neutral. 5 The current tax system chooses progressivity and "couples'
neutrality" at the expense of marriage neutrality. 6 Sometimes code
provisions interact in a manner that produces a marriage bonus. That
is, a married couple's combined tax is less than the sum of their two
tax liabilities had they remained single. Their liability declines upon
marrying. Currently, it is estimated that approximately 21 million
couples experience marriage penalties, while 25 million couples
experience marriage bonuses.7
BASIC TAX REFORM 102-07, 172-76 (1977); Z.I. GIRALDO, TAX POLICY AND THE DUALINCOME FAMILY: THE "MARRIAGE TAX" AND OTHER INEQUITIES (Ctr. For the Study of the

Family and the State, Policy Paper No. 3, 1978).
4See, e.g., James Edward Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching
the Horse
and the Carriage - 'But Let There be Spaces in Your Togetherness,' 67 TAX NOTES 539
(1995) (describing numerous tax provisions that contribute to marriage penalties).
5See Bittker, supra note 3, at 1395-96, 1429-31; see also Tax Treatment
of
Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses are Working: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong. 78-79 (1972) (statement of Edwin S.
Cohen, Asst. Secretary for Tax Policy). "No algebraic equation, no matter how
sophisticated, can solve this dilemma. Both ends of a seesaw cannot be up at the same
time." Id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 3, at 102-03; Note, The Case for
Mandatory Separate Filing by Married Persons, 91 YALE L.J. 363, 365 n.6 (1981)
(conveying a mathematical proof demonstrating the impossibility of simultaneous
achievement of marriage neutrality, couples neutrality, and progressivity).
6 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 3, at 1392-95; Amy C. Christian, The Joint
Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law,
13 J.L. & POL. 241, 274 n.1 18 (1997) ("The current rate structure, [for example,] ...
permits equal-income couples to pay equal taxes [through income splitting], and,
therefore, chooses the goal of 'couples neutrality' at the expense of 'marriage
neutrality'.").
7 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE
AND
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, at xiv (1997), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file.
Of married taxpayers, 42% suffer marriage penalties, 51% enjoy marriage bonuses, and
6% have tax liabilities equal to what their liabilities would amount to if single. See id In
1996, marriage penalties amounted to $29 billion in the aggregate, and marriage bonuses
totaled $33 billion. See id.
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In attempts to gain political capital in recent years, many
members of Congress have proposed bills aimed at eliminating or
reducing the unpopular marriage penalty. 8 To date, none has been
signed into law. In proposing to reform this aspect of the tax law,
proposed legislation has taken a variety of approaches. The debate in
the academic, political, and tax practice communities has usually
centered around the extent to which a given proposal achieves its
purported aim of making the tax system marriage neutral. Other
questions addressed in tax jurisprudence include the following:
Should concerns for marriage neutrality outweigh the goals
underlying couples neutrality or progressivity? 9 Whom does the
marriage penalty tend to burden, and whom does the marriage bonus
usually benefit?' 0 Does marriage penalty relief constitute a penalty on
single taxpayers?" I
An issue that has been wholly overlooked in traditional
analyses of marriage penalty relief is an analysis of how those relief
proposals affect the incentive a married couple faces as to whether to
file jointly or separately. 12 Under the current tax system, the vast
majority of married couples are encouraged to file jointly rather than
separately. 13 Proposals to eliminate or lessen the marriage penalty

8 See, e.g., H.R. 725, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 3524, 105th Cong. (1998);
Taxpayer Relief and Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2718, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997).

9See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 3, at 1395-96, 1429-31; Christian, supra
note
6, at 273 n.118.
10 See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black
and White,

in TAXING AMERICA 45, 45-57 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996)
(arguing African Americans tend to experience marriage penalties, while white
Americans are more likely to experience marriage bonuses).
I See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, What Can Be Done About Marriage
Penalties?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 1, 10 (1996) (acknowledging a reduction in marriage penalties
could be perceived as a penalty on single persons); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE

(AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 29-40 (1997) (describing single taxpayers' protest of
the singles' penalty and the resulting marriage penalty); Nancy E. Shurtz, Gender Equity
and Tax Policy: The Theory of "Taxing Men ", 6 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 485,

499 (1997) (describing rates prior to the 1969 advent of the marriage penalty as
containing a "singles' penalty.").
12 See Christian, supra note 2.
13 See infra Part I1.A..
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affect this incentive, in most cases intensifying it,' 4 and in at least one
instance diminishing it for some couples. 15 Most discussions of the
marriage penalty ignore the effect of relief proposals on the choice of
filing status. Yet it is an important issue. Examining the impact of
legislation on the married couple's selection of filing status is crucial
because important legal consequences flow from a decision to file
jointly - specifically joint and several liability.' 6 Of particular
concern is the fact that this liability regime is not merely onerous but
that it operates frequently to disadvantage women. Consequently,
examining how legislative proposals modify the incentives between
joint and separate filing is a worthy and important undertaking.
This Article will analyze various approaches to marriage
penalty relief and will investigate the effect each type of legislative
proposal would have on a couple's likelihood of filing jointly or
separately. Part II will describe the motivation the current code
provides to file jointly 17 and will set forth the legal consequence a
married couple experiences when it chooses to file jointly rather than
separately, describing the rule of joint and several liability. 18 It will
also elaborate briefly on the consequences women experience under
that liability regime.' 9 Part III first identifies the components of tax
law that contribute to marriage penalties and marriage bonuses - the
facets of tax law at which the proposals for relief are generally
aimed.2
Part III then analyzes those particular proposals and their
impact on the incentive for couples to file jointly rather than
separately. 2' Finally, Part IV concludes this Article, suggesting means
by which Congress could address the marriage penalty and avoid the
unintended negative consequences of previous proposals.
14See infra notes 44-131, 136-49 and accompanying text.
15See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.

16 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999) (imposing joint and several liability on
couples who file ajoint return). No analogous provision exists imposing joint and several
liability on married separate filers.
17See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying
text.
18 See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
19See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.

.20See infra notes 44-49, 56-58, 68-88 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 50-55, 59-67, 89-149 and accompanying text.
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II. THE INCENTIVE TO FILE JOINTLY AND ITS LEGAL CONSEQUENCE:
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

A. The Incentivefor Married Couples to File Jointly Rather than
Separately
An analysis of how measures for marriage penalty relief affect
a couple's incentive to file jointly or separately necessarily begins
with an examination of the current system's effect on the choice of
filing status. The current rate structure encourages most couples to
file joint returns, rather than separate ones, by establishing a lower tax
liability under the joint return.22 This pattern emerges as a result of
the relationship between tax rates under the joint return versus the
rates that exist under the separate return. As I have explained
previously:
Joint and separate return rates ...[have been] related
to each other [since 1948] by the concepts of income
splitting and aggregation. Those two features are
present in the joint return rates and cause a couple to
be taxed under joint rates as if each spouse had earned
separately half of the aggregate or combined net
income. Income splitting permits income from the
higher-bracket earner to be shifted into the other
spouse's lower bracket for purposes of tax
computation and effects a tax savings for the couple as
Under
a unit when the couple files jointly.
aggregation, when spouses file jointly, their incomes
22 See, e.g., Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and

Several Liability for Income Taxes Should be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 372
(1990) (explaining "[tihe tax system is designed almost to force married persons to file
");Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and
jointly, rather than separately ....
the Joint Return: Its Implications for Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 601-02 (1998)
[hereinafter Christian, Liability]; Amy C. Christian, Joint Versus Separate Filing: Joint
Return Tax Rates and Federal Complicity in DirectingEconomic Resourcesfrom Women
to Men, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 443, 447-48 (1997) [hereinafter Christian,
Complicity]; Christian, supra note 6, at 269-71; Harvey S. Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon
Joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 424-25 (1977).
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are added together prior to the application of the tax
rates.
Because U.S. tax rates are progressive,
aggregation causes some of the spouses' combined
income to be taxed at higher marginal rates than would
have applied to their incomes separately. Aggregation
thereby imposes additional tax on couples who file
jointly rather than separately. Income splitting and
aggregation are both components of and are built into
the joint return rates. That is, under joint filing,
spouses are treated as one taxpayer, and that one
taxpayer reports both sources of income, moving into
a higher tax bracket. However, the tax rates rise half
as quickly - that is, [joint] tax brackets are twice as
wide relative to the rate schedule for married couples
who file separately to allow for what is, in effect,
income splitting. Joint return rates are related to
separate return rates in that a joint return tax liability
may be derived by applying the separate return tax
rates to half of the spouses' combined net income and
23
multiplying the resulting tax by two.
One consequence of income splitting and aggregation in the
joint return rates is that they create an economic incentive for couples
to file jointly rather than separately. This motivation exists whenever
spouses' incomes differ, that is, whenever one spouse earns more than
the other.24 And, in fact, "[t]he greater the income difference[]
between husband and wife, the more valuable is the benefit from
income splitting and the smaller is the harm from income aggregation,
and thus, the greater is the couple's financial benefit from filing
jointly rather than separately. '25 Only when spousal incomes are
equal does the rate structure neither encourage nor discourage the
joint return relative to separate returns. 26 Empirical data confirm the
overpowering incentive within the code for married couples to file
23 Christian, Complicity, supra note 22, at 444-45 (citations omitted).
24 See id. at 447.
25 Id.
26 See id. See also Christian, supra note 6, at 269 tbl.2.
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jointly rather than separately. In 1993, an estimated
97.5% of married
27
couples selected the joint return filing status.

On occasion, however, married couples do file separately for
reasons unrelated to the rate structure. For example, separate returns
may be advantageous when one spouse's unreimbursed medical
expenses exceed 7.5% of that spouse's adjusted gross income but fall
short of 7.5% of the couple's combined adjusted gross income. Filing

separately, in such an instance, would permit a deduction to the
spouse with medical expenses, while filing jointly would preclude that
deduction. 28 Thus, in rare instances, a benefit from filing separately
may exceed the normal rate-structure advantages of joint filing. In
such cases, a married couple should file separately. Nonetheless,
most married couples find it more desirable to file jointly because the
overpowering incentive built into the rate structure to employ the joint
29
return nearly always outweighs any advantages of separate returns.

An analysis of the bills recommending marriage penalty relief
27 In 1993, an estimated 95.2% of all returns filed by married taxpayers were
joint returns, and an estimated 97.5% of all married couples filed jointly. These estimates
were derived from IRS statistics on the number of joint returns filed and the number of
separate returns filed. In 1993, 48,298,687 joint returns were submitted to the IRS. See
I.R.S., Pub. 1304, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1993 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 35
tbl.l.3 (1996). Only 2,437,311 separate returns were filed by married taxpayers. See id.
Consequently, the total number of returns filed by married taxpayers can be estimated to
be 50,735,998. Of these, 48,298,687 or 95.2% were joint returns. When one spouse files
separately, the other may also file separately or not at all depending on whether that other
spouse has sufficient income to trigger the filing requirement. An estimate of the number
of such couples would be half the number of separate returns filed in 1993 or half of
2,437,311. This is not a precise estimate, however, because undoubtedly some spouses of
separate filers did not have to file at all on their own behalf. Assuming 1,218,656 couples
fildd separately, the total number of married couples who filed returns would amount to
49,517,343 and the percentage of couples who chose to file jointly could be estimated as
48,298,687 divided by the total number of couples who filed, or 49,517,343. In this
manner, the percentage of couples who filed jointly could be estimated at 97.5%.
28 See I.R.C.
§ 213(a) (1999) (permitting a deduction for nonreimbursed
medical expenses but only to the extent they exceed 7.5% of AGI). Separate returns have
also been advantageous at times with regard to the limit on the capital loss deduction, the
matching of long-term and short-term capital gains and losses, and the allocation of
deductions between spouses that is available under separate returns. See Fred F. Murray,
Problems of Taxation of the Income of Spouses in the Context of Divorce and Separation,
COMMUNITY PROP. J., 20, 57 (1987); see also Christian, supra note 6, at 271-72.
29 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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demonstrates that those proposals affect the current incentive to file
jointly rather than separately. Indeed, almost all recently proposed
legislation would intensify the incentive to file jointly.3 ° Under these
approaches, an even greater percentage of married couples than under
current law would file jointly rather than separately. As a result, most
proposals aimed at reducing the marriage penalty would3 subject even
more couples to the regime of joint and several liability. 1
B. Joint and Several Liability, the Legal Consequence of the Joint
Return
As noted above, the effect of a legislative proposal on the
choice of filing status is an important issue because significant legal
consequences flow from the decision whether to file jointly or
separately.
One enormous, but rarely discussed, consequence
involves the rule of joint and several liability. When a couple files
jointly, it is treated as consenting, whether or not the spouses realize
it, to joint and several liability. 32 Under that liability system, the IRS
can collect a tax deficiency from one spouse even if it was generated
by the other spouse's unreported income or improper deduction. The
government need not seek payment from the spouse who created the
deficiency but, instead, may look to the non-delinquent spouse to
satisfy the deficiency even if that 33spouse neither knew of, nor
benefited from, the tax underpayment.
30 See infra notes 44-126, 136-49 and accompanying text.
31 In one proposal, however, the incentive to file jointly is diminished for
some couples. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text. Under that sole approach,
some couples would find it more valuable to file separately than jointly. For couples in

that group, fewer would eventually find themselves exposed to joint and several liability.
32 See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, ch. 289, § 5 1(b), 52 Stat. 447,
476 (1938); see also I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
33See generally Beck, supra note 22, at 328-29; Christian, Liability,
supra

note 22, at 535. An "innocent spouse" exception to joint and several liability exists
whereby a spouse may sometimes be able to escape the pernicious effects of joint and
several liability. See I.R.C. § 6015 (1999). This exception to joint and several liability,
however, is narrowly tailored and in many respects inadequate. For an excellent
discussion of the innocent-spouse rule of I.R.C. § 6015 and its shortcomings, see
generally Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, The New Innocent Spouse Provision: 'Reason
and Law Walking Hand in Hand?', 80 TAX NOTES 835, 843-49 (1998).
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Joint and several liability is problematic for a variety of

reasons. First, it works an obvious injustice by obligating one person
to satisfy the tax liability of another, according minimal regard to the
ability of, or to the propriety of having, the non-delinquent spouse
pay.34 Second, it tends, in operation, to disadvantage women much
more than men. That is, it has been shown to operate more frequently
and more onerously against women than against men, both as applied

and in its very structure. Professor Richard Beck, for example, has
demonstrated that joint and several liability, as applied, has been used
to collect husbands' deficiencies from wives and ex-wives much more
frequently than it has been commissioned in collecting wives' tax
liabilities from husbands or ex-husbands. 35 A variety of social and
economic factors operating in the United States contribute to this
pattern.36 Furthermore, as applied, joint and several liability is not
34 See, e.g., Christian, Liability, supra note 22, at 536,
592-93.

See Beck, supra note 22, at 320 & n.4, 327-28 n.34 (estimating
that
approximately 90% of the collections from the spouse who did not generate the
deficiency penalized women and that only 10% penalized men). See also Richard C.E.
Beck, The Innocent Spouse Rules, 15 FAM. ADvoC., 30 (1992); Jerome Borison, Alice
Through a Very Dark and Confusing Looking Glass: Getting Equity from the Tax Court
in Innocent Spouse Cases, 30 FAM. L.Q. 123, 125 (1996); Christian, Liability, supra note
22, at 593-98; H.J. Cummins, Catch 1040: Joint Returns Mean Joint Liability - And In
Some Cases, That Means Trouble, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1994, available at 1994 WL
7442627 (claiming 95% of joint liability cases involve wives seeking relief from their
husbands' or ex-husbands' tax liabilities); Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses,
Reasonable Women and Divorce: The Gap Between Reality and the Internal Revenue
Code, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421, 424-25 (1996) (noting in 90% of innocent spouse
cases the spouse seeking relief from joint and several liability is the wife or ex-wife); Lisa
K. Edison-Smith, Comment, "If You Love Me, You'll Sign My Tax Return ": Spousal Joint
andSeveral Liabilityfor FederalIncome Taxes and the "Innocent Spouse" Exception, 18
HAMLINE L. REv. 102, 119, 123-24 (1994) (noting in over 90% of the cases from 1971
through 1990 in which taxpayers sought relief from joint and several liability, the
taxpayer was a wife or ex-wife rather than a husband or ex-husband).
36 Those factors include, first, men are more likely than women to be selfemployed, and thus, men are more able to conceal income or invent deductions than
women. See Beck, supra note 22, at 320 n.4, 376-77; Michael C. Durst, ABA Section of
Tax'n & Am. Bar Found., Report of the Second Invitational Conference on Income Tax
Compliance (1988), reprinted in 42 TAX LAW. 705, 716-21 (1989) ("Compliance rates
among the self-employed ... are far lower" than compliance rates for wages, salaries,
interest, dividends, and capital gains.). Second, men tend to take more aggressive
reporting positions than women, thereby, generating more tax deficiencies. See Karyl A.
Kinsey, Survey Data on Tax Compliance:A Compendium and Review, in AMERICAN BAR
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only more likely to cause wives to pay their husbands' deficiencies
more frequently than the reverse, but it is also more likely to shift

heavy burdens from husbands to wives while shifting relatively light
burdens from wives to their husbands.3 7 Thus, the rule of joint and
several liability operates more onerously against women than men.

Joint and several liability penalizes women more than men not
merely as applied in the social context, but also systemically.3" The
tax code, itself, is internally biased against women: two or more
features of the code interact in a manner that predictably harms wives
more severely, or more often, than their husbands. The incentive in

39
the rate structure for couples to file jointly rather than separately

interacts with the rule of joint and several liability 40 to create one such

example of systemic bias. As noted above, the incentive to file jointly
is strongest for couples in which spouses' incomes differ; the more
they differ, the greater the incentive to use the joint return. 41 Because
FOUNDATION TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE PROJECT WORKING PAPER 8716, at 29 (1987)

(suggesting men, psychologically, are more likely to take aggressive reporting positions
than women and that, in fact, they do so); Beck, supra note 22, at 376. Third, women are
less likely than men to be self-employed, so women who work in the paid work force are
more likely than men to have wages or salaries that the IRS can easily garnish. See Beck,
supra note 22, at 320, 377. And fourth, wives are more likely than husbands to remain in
the marital home upon separation or divorce and thus tend to be easier for the IRS to
locate than are their ex-husbands. See Cummins, supra note 35; Edison-Smith, supra
note 35, at 123; H.J. Cummins, Payingfor the Sins of a Spouse, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Feb. 14, 1994, at DI0; Borison, supra note 35, at 125-26; cf. Ken Rankin, AICPA Advises
IRS on Fairer Divorce Procedures, 10 ACCT. TODAY, July 29, 1996, at 8, available in
1996 WL 8970070 (noting collection efforts often proceed against the wife because she
commonly remains in the collection region in which the return was originally filed and
because the husband is more likely to move to a different IRS region).
37See Christian, Liability, supra note 22, at 595. "Because
wives have lower
average earnings than husbands, the joint return deficiencies caused by the husband are
likely to be greater than those caused by the wife." Id. at 595-97. See also Beck, supra
note 22, at 320 n.4.
38 For a description of three manners in which joint and several liability
interacts with other aspects of the tax code to create systemic bias against women, see
Christian, Liability, supra note 22, at 536-37, 598-615.
39See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text. Compare
I.R.C. § I(a)
(1999) with 1.R.C. § I(d) (1999).
40 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
41 In general, this pattern would remain true under the legislative proposals
for marriage penalty relief. See infra Part Ill.

1999] LEGISLATION AND FILING STATUS

313

joint and several liability applies only when couples file jointly, and
because the incentive to file jointly is strongest for couples in which
spouses' incomes differ, the tax code is designed to cause joint and
several liability to apply with the greatest frequency when one spouse,
usually the husband, earns significantly more than the other, usually
the wife. 42 This situation Of unequal resources is precisely when it is
least fair to impose joint and several liability.
Joint and several liability is objectionable for a Variety of
reasons. It shifts liability from one taxpayer to another, despite
potentially extreme financial hardship. The rationales used to justify
the rule do not, in fact, persuade.43 More alarmingly, joint and several
liability functions in the social setting to harm women more often and
more acutely than men, interacting systemically with other elements
of the joint return system to create a variety of unjust burdens - all
falling primarily on women. Any change in the law that would cause
joint and several liability to apply to even more couples than it does
currently would be ill-advised, inequitable, and imprudent, even if the
reform is intended merely to ameliorate the marriage penalty.
III.

SOURCES OF THE MARRIAGE PENALTY AND LEGISLATIVE
APPROACHES TO CHANGE

The following sections of this article identify various causes
of the marriage penalty and then analyze related relief proposals with
respect to their impact on a couple's choice of filing status. Virtually
none of these measures would alleviate the problem of joint and
several liability. In fact, most proposals for marriage penalty relief
would heighten the problem of joint and several liability by making
the joint return even more attractive than it already is., Consequently,
joint and several liability would be visited on even more couples than
under current law since more would file jointly.

42 See Christian, Liability, supra note 22, at 604-09.
43See generally Christian, Liability, supra note
22.
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A. The EarnedIncome Tax Credit
The Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC") 44 is one program in
the tax code that has attracted criticism for penalizing marriage
significantly among the working poor. 45 Suggesting that the EITC, in

fact, discourages marriage or encourages divorce would be speculative
because it is unknown to what extent the economic effects translate
into behavior. Social phenomena, including lack of understanding of
the provisions' effects among those subject to it, could offset any
actual behavioral response to this marriage penalty.46
Unfortunately, proposals aimed at ameliorating the EITC
marriage penalty fail to reduce the incidence of joint returns among
married couples. Thus, as explained below, these proposals do
nothing to minimize the impact of joint and several liability on the

nation's working poor.
Although the EITC is available to both single and married
taxpayers, a marriage penalty results from the fact that the credit's
phaseout levels are the same for all taxpayers, regardless of marital
status.47 Thus, two individuals who are single and earn less than the
44I.R.C. § 32 (1999).

See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and
the
Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 559-64 (1995);
Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint
Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 1479-81 (1997); McCaffery, supra note 3, at 99596.
46 See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 45, at 559-60; Michael J. Caballero, The
Earned Income Tax Credit: The Poverty Program That Is Too Popular, 48 TAx LAW.
435, 460 (1995) (suggesting the EITC marriage penalty may not affect major life
decisions such as marriage or divorce despite its presence in the code).
47See Alstott, supra note 45, at 562. The following example illustrates
the
EITC marriage penalty:
The EITC is available to both single-parent and married-couple
families, but the amount of the credit is the same for single
parents and for married couples that have the same income and
number of children. Thus, a married couple earning $28,000
receives no EITC, but two single people, each earning $14,000,
may each receive a substantial EITC. As a consequence, the
EITC can impose huge marriage penalties, particularly relative to
income.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Brown, supra note 45, at 1480-81; Caballero,
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phaseout amount would each be fully eligible for the EITC. If they
marry, however, their incomes will be combined for purposes of

computing the credit. This combined income may push them into or
above the phaseout level, thus reducing the amount of the credit for
which they would be eligible or perhaps eliminating their credit
altogether.48 Proposals aimed at reducing the EITC marriage penalty
generally seek to do so by directly or indirectly increasing the

to
phaseout levels only for married couples, thus, permitting them 49
retain more of the EITC despite the aggregation of spousal incomes.

supra note 46, at 460 (providing example illustrating the EITC marriage penalty); Carlyn
S. McCaffrey & Elyse G. Kirschner, Family Tax Planning Under the New Law, 16 FAM.
ADvoc. 10, 68 (1994).
48 See McCaffrey & Kirschner, supra note 47, at 68 (providing illustration of
how the phaseout provisions cause a marriage penalty).
49 See Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999 (Engrossed Senate Amendment), H.R.
2488, 106th Cong. § 202 (1999) ("Paragraph (2) of section 32(b) (relating to percentages
and amounts) is amended - (1) by striking 'AMOUNTS. - The earned' and inserting
'AMOUNTS.- (A) IN GENERAL.- Subject to subparagraph (B), the earned,' and (2) by
adding at the end the following new subparagraph: '(B) JOINT RETURNS.- In the case of a
joint return, the phaseout amount determined under subparagraph (A) shall be increased
by $2,000."'); Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, 106th Cong. § 202(a) (1999)
("Paragraph (2) of section 32(b) (relating to percentages and amounts) is amended -...
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: '(B) JOINT RETURNS.- In the
case of a joint return, the phaseout amount determined under subparagraph (A) shall be
increased by $2,000'.") (direct increase in phaseout levels); Marriage Tax Penalty Relief
Act of 1999, H.R. 1453, 106th Cong. §2(c) (1999) ("Earned Income Credit Phaseout to
Reflect Deduction. - Paragraph (2) of section 32(c) of such Code (defining earned
income) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: '(C)
MARRIAGE PENALTY REDUCTION.- Solely for purposes of applying subsection (a)(2)(B)
[relating to the phaseout rules], earned income for any taxable year shall be reduced by an
amount equal to the amount of the deduction allowed to the taxpayer for such taxable year
under section 222 [relating to the two-earner deduction]'." The reduction in the amount
treated as earned income for purposes of the EITC phaseout allows married couples, in
effect, a more favorable phaseout schedule than they would otherwise enjoy.) (indirect
increase in phaseout levels); Income Security Enhancement Act of 1999, S. 8, 106th
Cong. § 202(c) (1999) (same in essence as H.R. 1453, 106th Cong., supra) (indirect
increase in phaseout levels); S. 2147, 105th Cong. § 1(c) (1998) (same in essence as H.R.
1453, 106th Cong., supra) (indirect increase in phaseout levels); H.R. 3995, 105th Cong.
§ 1(a) (1998) ("Paragraph (2) of Section 32(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(relating to phaseout amount) is amended by adding at the end the following flush
sentence: 'In the case of a joint return for a taxable year beginning after December 31,
1998, the preceding table shall be applied by substituting '$16,020' for '$11,610' each
place it appears'.") (direct increase in phaseout levels); Universal Tobacco Settlement
Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997), Amendment No. 2686 to Amendment No. 2437 offered
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These proposals are problematic from the perspective of
choice of filing status because none changes the current threshold

requirement that to be eligible for the EITC, married taxpayers must
file jointly. 50 The EITC is completely unavailable to married couples
who file separate returns. None of the recent marriage penalty relief
proposals that address the EITC have repealed the requirement that a
married couple must file jointly. Thus, despite proposals to improve

the EITC, that credit would remain a code provision that makes joint
returns relatively appealing and separate returns relatively
disadvantageous. 5 1 This favoring of the joint return would plainly
compound the incentive for married couples to file jointly, not
separately. 52 Consequently, under these proposals for marriage
penalty relief, more married couples in the lower-income tax brackets
would use joint returns to avail themselves of the credit, and thus,
more would become jeopardized by the regime of joint and several

liability.
As I have noted elsewhere, 53 the EITC's joint-return
requirement is especially inappropriate because the low-bracket
couples normally eligible for the credit 54 do not experience any
by Mr. Gramm on June 10, 1998, Section XX(c) ("EARNED INCOME CREDIT PHASEOUT To
REFLECT DEDUCTION.- Section 32(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (defining

earned income) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: '(C)
MARRIAGE PENALTY REDUCTION.- Solely for purposes of applying subsection (a)(2)(B)

[relating to the phaseout rules], earned income for any taxable year shall be reduced by an
amount equal to the amount of the deduction allowed to the taxpayer for such taxable year
under section 222 [relating to a deduction for married taxpayers to reduce the marriage
penalty]'." The reduction in the amount treated as earned income for purposes of the
EITC phaseout allows married couples, in effect, a more favorable phaseout schedule.)
(indirect increase in phaseout levels) and Amendment No. 2688 to Amendment No. 2437
offered by Mr. Daschle on June 10, 1998, Section XXOI(c) (same as'language in the
Gramm amendment) (indirect increase in phaseout levels).
50 See I.R.C. § 32(d) (1999) (stating, "[i]n the case of an individual who is
married (within the meaning of section 7703), this section [referring to I.R.C. § 32 which
authorizes the credit] shall apply only if a joint return is filed for the taxable year under
section 6013.").
51See Christian, supra note 2, at 171, 172.
52 See id.
53

See id., at 171, n.23.
54 In general, a taxpayer must have low income to be eligible for the EITC.
See I.R.C. § 32(a)(2) (1999) (limiting credit, phasing it out as incomes rise).
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incentive from the rate structure to file jointly. Under normal
circumstances, the low-bracket couple would not benefit from filing
jointly because that couple generally falls in the lowest tax bracket
where the privilege of income splitting is not found., In general,
income splitting does not afford such a couple any tax savings since
all of its income is already in the lowest available tax bracket.
Because income splitting does not assist such couples, that feature of
joint rates does not encourage them to file jointly rather than
separately. Absent the EITC-imposed requirement that these lowincome married couples file jointly, they would experience no
incentive from the rate structure to do so. They could file separately,
free from financial constraint. If it were not for the joint-return
requirement in the EITC, such couples could avoid joint and several
liability altogether. The EITC, however, provides an overpowering
incentive for these low-income couples to file jointly and results not
merely in a slight expansion in the incidence of couples vulnerable to
joint and several liability, but in a large increase.55
B. The StandardDeduction.
The standard deduction is another element of the code that has
long been criticized as penalizing marriage. 56 In most cases, as
described below, marriage penalty relief proposals promising to
reform the standard deduction do nothing to discourage joint filing
and, thus, do nothing to reduce the incidence of joint and several
liability. In fact, some proposals eliminate the standard deduction
marriage penalty by unnecessarily making joint returns more
favorable compared to separate returns than they are under current
law. Thus, some proposals for relief actually exacerbate the problem
of joint and several liability by making it apply to even more couples
than it does under current law.
55 See Christian, supra note 2, at 171, n.23.
56 See, e.g., Forman, supra note 11, at 8, 10; David S. Hulse, Alternatives for
Eliminating the MarriagePenalty, 66 TAx NOTES 251, 252 (1995); Susan Kalinka, Acts
1990, No. 1009: The Repeal of Provisionsfor Separationfrom Bed and Board Increases
The FederalIncome Tax Burden of SeparatedSpouses in Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REV. 597,
652 (1993).
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Marriage is punished under the current standard deduction in
that the allowance amounts to only $5,000 for married couples
whether the spouses file jointly or separately. 57 By contrast, if a
couple remains unmarried, its standard deduction consists of two
$3,000 amounts, one for each individual. 8 Upon marrying a couple's
combined standard deduction goes from a beneficial $6,000 to a less
generous $5,000. The loss of the differential $1,000 deduction results
in an increase in tax liability - a marriage penalty.
Over the years Congress has introduced many bills designed
to end this particular marriage penalty, but none has yet been
enacted. 9 Most proposals dispose of this penalty by making the
standard deduction for married taxpayers, whether they file jointly or
separately, twice that of the unmarried individual's standard
deduction. 60 In this manner, spouses continue to enjoy the equivalent
See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(A)&(D) (1999) (providing $5,000 standard deduction
for a joint return and $2,500 standard deduction for each of the two separate returns a
couple would submit if filing separately).
58 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(C) (1999) (providing $3,000 standard deduction in
the case of an unmarried individual).
See, e.g., Common Sense Family Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2646,
106th Cong. § 101 (1999); Financial Freedom Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § Ill
(1999); Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 108, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); H.R. 3524, 105th
Cong. (1998); Taxpayer Relief and Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2718, 105th Cong. § 3
(1997).
60 For example,
the Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 108, 106th Cong. § 2
(1999) makes the standard deduction marriage neutral through the following language:
(a) IN GENERAL. - Paragraph (2) of section 63(C) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to standard deduction) is amended (1) by striking '$5,000' in subparagraph (A) and inserting 'twice
the dollar amount in effect under subparagraph (C) for the taxable
year';
(2) by adding 'or' at the end of subparagraph (B);
(3) by striking 'in the case of' and all that follows in subparagraph
(C) and inserting 'in any other case.'; and
(4) by striking subparagraph (D).
Id. § 2(a). This proposed amendment would make the standard deduction marriage
neutral by making the deduction applicable to joint filers twice as large as the standard
deduction applicable to single filers. Compare H.R. 108, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(1) with
I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(C)(1999). Furthermore, by striking everything after and including "in
the case of' and substituting "in any other case," the proposal would make the standard
deduction applicable to married separate filers identical .to the one for single taxpayers.
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of both single standard deductions upon marrying. Furthermore, this
approach to marriage penalty elimination makes no distinction in
treatment between couples who file jointly and those who file
separately. Under either filing status, the standard deduction amount
is identical. 6 1 This approach to marriage penalty relief, therefore,
neither encourages nor discourages the use of joint returns, promoting
neutrality between the two married filing statuses.
Two recent proposals, however, eliminate the marriage
penalty found in the standard deduction by creating a new set of
standard deductions which favor the joint return over the separate
return. 62 In either case, when the proposed standard deductions are
fully phased in, a joint return would yield a standard deduction equal
in amount to twice the standard deduction for single taxpayers.6 3 For
Compare H.R. 108, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(3) & (4) with I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(C) &(D) (1999).
61 Separate filers would be entitled to two $3,000 standard deductions, and a
jointly filing couple would be authorized to take one $6,000 standard deduction. See
supra note 60.
62 See Marriage Penalty Elimination Act of 1999, S. 284, 106th Cong., § 2
(1999); Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997) (Amendment
No. 2686 to Amendment No. 2437 offered by Mr. Gramm on June 10, 1998, Section
XX(a)).
63
See S. 284, 106th Cong. § 2 (adding new paragraph (7) to I.R.C. § 63(c),
stating:
(7) Elimination of Marriage Penalty for Joint Filers. -.
(A) INGENERAL. - In the case of a joint return or a surviving spouse
.... the basic standard deduction under paragraph (2)(A) shall be
increased by an amount equal to the applicable percentage [relating
to the phase in of the increase] of the excess of(i) 200 percent of the basic standard deduction in
effect for the taxable year under paragraph (2)(C), over
(ii) the basic standard deduction in effect for the
taxable year under paragraph (2)(A) (without regard to this
paragraph).)
-See also S. 1415, 105th Cong. (Gramm Amendment) (adding new above-the-line
deduction for use in addition to the joint return standard deduction and stating:
SEC. 222. DEDUCTION FOR MARRIED COUPLES TO ELIMINATE THE MARRIAGE
PENALTY.

(a) IN GENERAL. -In the case of a joint return under section 6013 for
the taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to the
applicable percentage [relating to the phase in of the deduction] of the excess
(if any) of-
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example, if the standard deduction for a single taxpayer is $3,000, as
under current law, 64 then under each proposal, a married couple filing
jointly would be entitled to a standard deduction of $6,000.65 The
marriage penalty would be eliminated for couples who file jointly.66
Although the proposals increase the standard deduction for
joint filers, they unfortunately make no corresponding upward
adjustment to the standard deduction for separate filers. Under the
current code provision, that deduction amounts to only $2,500 per
spouse,6 7 and it would remain so under the proposed reforms. Thus,
while the provisions would introduce marriage neutrality into the
standard deduction, they would also eliminate the neutrality that
already exists between the joint and separate return. By increasing the
joint return standard deduction to $6,000 while preserving the $2,500
per person (or $5,000 per couple) separate return standard deduction,
an additional incentive would arise for couples to file jointly. More
couples than under current law would do so and would be subject to
(1) the sum of the amounts determined under subparagraphs (B)
and (C) of section 63(c)(2) for such taxable year (relating to the
basic standard deduction for a head of a household and a single
individual, respectively), over
(2) the amount determined under section 63(c)(2)(A) for such
taxable year (relating to the basic standard deduction for a joint
return)).
64 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(C) (1999).
65 Under S. 284, 106th Cong. § 2(a), the standard $5,000 deduction currently
available to ajoint filer under I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(A) would be increased by twice the single
standard deduction, $6,000 and then reduced by the standard deduction otherwise
available to a joint filer, $5,000. See id. That is, the joint filer's $5,000 standard
deduction would be increased by $1,000 and would amount to $6,000, or twice the
standard deduction available to single taxpayers.
Under the Gramm Amendment to S. 1415, 105th Cong., couples filing jointly
would be entitled to a deduction in addition to the $5,000 joint return standard deduction.
That additional deduction would amount to the excess of two unmarried person's standard
deductions, or $6,000, over the $5,000 joint return standard deduction. Thus, married
couples filing jointly would be entitled to an extra deduction of $1,000. When added to
the $5,000joint return standard deduction, the proposal would afford these couples a total
deduction of $6,000, or twice the standard deduction available to single taxpayers. See id.
66 Two single individuals would each receive a $3,000 standard deduction,
totaling $6,000. Upon marrying, they could file jointly and would be entitled to a $6,000
deduction. See supra note 65.
67 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(D) (1999).
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joint and several liability.
In an effort to achieve marriage neutrality, the, proposals
described above introduce an additional incentive into the code for
married couples to choose joint returns over separate ones. The
proposals could easily avoid such an incentive simply by adjusting the
separate return standard deduction upward as well, so that two
separate return standard deductions would also amount to $6,000.
The bills, however, fail to increase the separate return standard
deduction. As currently drafted, these measures would motivate more
couples to file jointly, and thus, exacerbate the problem of joint and
several liability by causing it to apply to more couples.
C. The Rate Structure Marriage Penalty:A MarriagePenaltyfor TwoEarner Couples and a MarriageBonusfor Single-EarnerCouples
The most widely known marriage penalty and marriage bonus
in the tax system results from the structure of tax rates. 6 8 "The rates
for couples who file joint returns and the rates that apply to single
[individuals] ... relate to each other so that some couples - those in
which [the] spouses' incomes are similar - experience a marriage
penalty., 69 These individuals' combined tax liability increases when
they marry. "At the same time, however, other couples - those in
70
which the spouses' incomes differ - [enjoy] . . . a marriage bonus.',
The tax bills of these individuals decline when they marry.
Understanding how the rate structure currently gives rise to
marriage penalties and marriage bonuses requires an appreciation,
first, of income splitting and aggregation and, second, of the rates that
apply to single individuals. Income splitting and aggregation will be
described first.
Income splitting and aggregation are the mechanisms by
which joint rates may be derived from separate return rates. 71 As
noted above, when two spouses file a joint return, they report their
68 See, e.g., Christian, supra note 6, at 272-73 & n. 118.
69

Christian, supra note 2, at 172; see also Brown, supra note 10, at 49-52.

70 Christian, supra note 2, at 172; see also Brown, supra note 10, at 49-52.
71

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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combined incomes. 72 This practice is required by the tax code 73 and is
known as income aggregation because the spouses must aggregate
their net incomes before applying the progressive tax rates to compute
tax liability. The tax law then assumes that each spouse earned half of
the combined income. This assumption is known as income splitting.
Income splitting has been a feature of the joint return rates since
194874 when, for the first time, Congress required joint tax rates to
rise half as quickly as the rates for married couples who filed
separately. Congress achieved this mandate by making the joint tax
brackets twice
as wide as the brackets for married couples who filed
75
separately.

As previously noted, income splitting and aggregation are the
two mechanisms by which joint return liabilities may be computed
using separate return rates. A married couple's joint tax liability may
be arrived at indirectly by treating the couple as if each spouse had
earned half of the combined income, by applying separate return rates
to those incomes,
and then by adding the two separate return liabilities
76
together.

Consider the following hypothetical example. A couple exists
in which the husband earns $80,000 and the wife earns $40,000. If
the spouses file jointly, their gross income will be listed on the joint
return as $120,000, but each will be treated, using separate return
rates, as if he or she earned half of that total, or $60,000. Essentially,
the joint rates operate as if each spouse earned $60,000, taxed under
separate rates, rather than the husband earning $80,000 and the wife
earning $40,000. For tax computation purposes, the joint return rates,
through income splitting, treat $20,000 worth of income as having
72 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
73 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999) ("[l]fajoint return is made, the
tax shall be

computed on the aggregate income.").
74 See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(62

Stat. 110, 114) 85, 92-93.
75

Compare the brackets contained in I.R.C. § ](a) (1999) (tax brackets for

married taxpayers filing jointly) with those of I.R.C. § 1(d) (1999) (tax brackets for
married taxpayers filing separately). See also Christian, Complicity, supra note 22, at
445.
76 See Christian, Complicity, supra note 22; supra note 23 and accompanying
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been shifted from the husband to the wife. The husband actually
earned $80,000, but the joint rates treat him as having earned $60,000,
while the wife actually earned $40,000, but is treated as having earned
$60,000. In essence, the joint return rates cause $20,000 to be
"shifted" from the husband to the wife. This shifting of income
effects a tax savings for the couple because $20,000 of income is
essentially shifted from the husband's higher separate rate tax bracket
into the wife's lower separate rate tax bracket. Income splitting under
the joint return confers a tax savings whenever spouses' incomes
differ. Under income splitting, any married couple earning the same
total income as this couple, $120,000, would have the same joint
return liability, regardless of the distribution of incomes between the
spouses. This happens because in all cases, the joint tax rates will
treat each spouse as if he or she earned half of the combined $120,000
of income, or $60,000. 7

By contrast, if these hypothetical spouses filed separately, they
would not receive the benefit of income splitting.78 The husband
would be taxed under separate rates on $80,000, not $60,000, and the
wife would be taxed under separate rates on $40,000, not $60,000.
Upon filing separately, the couple would not be able to shift $20,000
from the husband's higher separate return rate bracket into the wife's
lower tax bracket and would not be able to effect a tax savings
because the couple would forego the joint return benefit of income
splitting. The sum of their separate return liabilities would exceed the
liability that would have resulted from filing jointly.
The phenomenon of income splitting most benefits those
couples whose incomes most differ. The more incomes differ, the
greater the benefit from income splitting and filing jointly. Thus, a
couple in which spouses' incomes are disparate, like the one described
above, obtains a large tax savings from income splitting because a
significant amount of income is treated as shifted from the higher
bracket to the lower bracket. By contrast, the more similar the
spouses' incomes, the smaller the benefit from income splitting.
77See Christian, supra note 6. Thus, joint returns would generate
identical

liabilities for four couples in which incomes were, respectively:
$100,000/$20,000; $80,000/$40,000; and $60,000/$60,000.
See Christian, supra note 6, at 260.

$120,000/$0;
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Income splitting operates in those cases to shift smaller amounts of
income from the higher-earning spouse to the lower earner, thus
effecting a smaller tax savings. Spouses with equal incomes get no
benefit whatsoever from income splitting. They may not shift income
from one spouse's higher bracket into the other's lower bracket
because the incomes are already equal, and the two spouses, therefore,
already fall in the same tax brackets. As a consequence, filing jointly
provides no tax savings relative to separate filing when spouses'
incomes are equal.
The above patterns are easily conveyed when represented
pictorially. Graph 1, below, depicts the pattern of joint return and
combined separate return tax liabilities for various. couples for whom
combined income is the same, say $120,000, but for. whom the
distribution of earnings between the two spouses varies. The levels
indicated on the left side of the graph represent the joint versus
separate liabilities a couple would face if one spouse earned
significantly more than the other, for instance, $120,000 in earnings of
one spouse and no earnings by the other spouse. As one moves across
the graph to the right, the distribution of earnings between the two
spouses becomes more and more equal. Thus, the joint return and
separate return liabilities represented in the middle of the graph could
be those of a couple in which one spouse earns $80,000 while the
other earns $40,000. The joint return and separate return liabilities
represented on the right side of the graph are those for a couple with
the same total income, $120,000, but where the two spouses' earnings
are exactly equal, or $60,000 each.
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Graph 1.

Note that for the disparate-income couple, the joint return
liability is much lower than the separate return liability. This tax
savings from filing jointly is a consequence of the income splitting
described above that is available to joint filers. 79 Also notice that
regardless of the distribution of income between the two spouses, the
joint return liability is the same for all couples because their combined
income is the same for each couple, $120,000.80
Another important observation from the chart is that as
spousal incomes converge, i.e., as one moves across the chart to the
8
right, the benefit from income splitting becomes smaller and smaller, '
and the joint return and separate return liabilities thus move closer
together. Because the benefit of income splitting diminishes as
spouses' incomes converge, joint filing conveys a smaller and smaller
benefit relative to separate filing as one moves across the chart to the
right. This phenomenon appears pictorially in the form of the
79 See supra notes 76-78, and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 6 and 77 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 76-78, and accompanying text.
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downward slope of the separate liability line as it moves towards, and
finally meets, the joint liability line where spouses' incomes equal
each other. 82 Joint and separate return liabilities finally equal each
other when the two spouses' incomes become exactly equal.83 An
equal-income couple, where both spouses earn $60,000 for example,
would incur the same tax liability by filing separately as by filing
jointly because income splitting would not have provided any benefit
to such a couple.
Graph 1, above, illustrates the joint and separate return
liabilities that a married couple would face at a given level of
combined taxable income. It represents the structure of joint rates
relative to separate return rates for married individuals. The manner
in which this rate structure gives rise to the marriage penalty and
marriage bonus becomes apparent when one considers the rates that
are imposed on unmarried individuals.
I have previously described the relationship between rates
applying to single taxpayers and those that apply to married couples:
[As currently formulated, the marriage penalty and
bonus that result from the rate structure] arose in 1969.
In that year, Congress lowered the tax rates applicable
to unmarried individuals in response to single
taxpayers' complaints that the 1948 adoption of
income splitting only for married taxpayers had shifted
the income tax burden disproportionately to unmarried
individuals. Previously, [unmarried rates were equal
to the rates that applied to separately filing married
individuals] . . .:

Consequently, prior to 1969, a

couple in which a man and woman earned equal
incomes would generate the same total tax liability,
whether the taxpayers were single or whether they
filed jointly as a married couple. The 1969 reduction
in individual rates for single taxpayers without a
concomitant reduction in joint tax rates thereby gave
82 The downward slope in the couple's separate return liability line results

from the absence of income splitting in separate return rates. Compare separate return
liability line with notes 6 and 77, supra, and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 76-78, and accompanying text.
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84
rise to the possibility of a marriage penalty.
Consider an unmarried couple in which two individuals earn
the same combined income, $120,000, as the hypothetical married
couple described above. The 1969 reduction in individual rates for
single taxpayers caused singles' tax rates to fit, as shown below,
relative to the rates applicable to married taxpayers.

Graph 2.
Dl

El

MFS
Single

The broken line represents the sum of the tax liabilities of two
unmarried individuals whose combined income is the same as that of
the married couple, $120,000. Thus, an unmarried couple in which
one individual earns more than the other, one earns $120,000 while
the other has no income, for example, would generate a higher
combined tax liability than would two single individuals of equal
earning capacity, say $60,000 each. 8
Focusing first on equal-income couples on the right side of the
diagram, Graph 2 shows that two single taxpayers with equal incomes
would each enjoy the post-1969 low single rates. Upon marrying,
supra note 6, at 276-77 (citations omitted).
85This downward slope in the unmarried couple's liability results from the
absence of income splitting in single rates. See supra note 82.
84Christian,

328

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVI

however, the higher rates would apply. For spouses who earned
similar incomes, income splitting under the joint return would provide
little or no benefit relative to the separate return. Thus, for those
couples income splitting under the joint return would provide a
smaller benefit than the tax cut Congress provided to singles in 1969.
For individuals earning similar incomes, the tax benefits of being
single outweigh the income splitting-benefit from filing jointly as a
married person. After 1969, similar-income couples, thus, begin to
experience a marriage penalty as a result of the tax rates.8 6 The closer
the spouses' incomes are to each other, the greater is the penalty.
The 1969 reduction in rates for single taxpayers was
not so large, however, that it made taxpayers better off
single than married in all cases. [Moving to the left
side of the diagram, above,] [flor married couples with
disparate incomes, [those] who could benefit [greatly]
from income splitting. . ., the reduction in taxes from
filing jointly rather than separately could still exceed
the reduction Congress had conferred on single
taxpayers in 1969. Consequently, some couples could
obtain a larger tax reduction by marrying and by filing
jointly than they could under the rate reduction for
singles in 1969. Those couples experience a marriage
benefit rather than a marriage penalty [as a result of
the rate structure].87
The disparate-income couple obtains significant benefit by
marrying and filing jointly rather than remaining single. Such a
couple derives more benefit from income splitting than from the 1969
tax cut for singles. For these disparate-income couples, the rate
structure creates a marriage bonus. 88 The greater the disparity in
spouses' incomes, the greater the marriage bonus.

86 That is, for similar-income couples, joint return liabilities exceed
combined single liabilities.
87 Christian, supra note 6, at 277 (citations omitted).
88 That is, joint return liability for disparate-income couples is less than
combined single liabilities.
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1. Proposals offering relief through a rough and indirect offset to the
rate structure: the two-earner deduction or credit
Many recent proposals in Congress attempt to address the
marriage penalty that arises from the rate structure - the penalty that
is imposed primarily on similar-income couples. These proposals take
a variety of approaches. One method indirectly addresses the lack of
marriage neutrality in the rate structure, not by altering that rate
structure, but by proposing a deduction or credit for two-earner
couples.8 9 The purpose of such a deduction or credit is to allow an
approximate offset to the financial harm that the rate structure
marriage penalty may impose. The deductions or credits are generally
available only to two-earner couples, those in which both spouses
participate in the paid work force. This requirement is an attempt to
funnel marriage penalty relief only to those who are penalized,

similar-income couples. Of course, these legislative approaches do
not eliminate marriage bonuses enjoyed by disparate-income couples.
Unfortunately, these proposals would each increase the
incidence of joint and several liability: these proposals are
problematic from the perspective of choice of filing status because in
each case, the availability of the tax preference is conditioned on
using a joint return. 90 The deduction or credit to offset the marriage
89 See Marriage Tax Penalty Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 1453, 106th Cong. § 2
(1999) (proposing a two-earner deduction); Income Security Enhancement Act of 1999,
S.8, 106th Cong. § 202 (1999) (proposing a two-earner deduction); S. 2147, 105th Cong.
§ 1 (1998) (proposing a two-earner deduction); Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S.
1415, 105th Cong. (1997) (Amendment No. 2688 to Amendment No. 2437 offered by
Mr. Daschle on June 10, 1998, § XX0I(a)) (proposing a deduction for two-earner married
couples); Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 2593, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997) (proposing a
deduction for two-earner married couples); Tax Freedom for Families Act of 1997, H.R.
1584, 105th Cong. § 202 (1997) (proposing a credit to reduce a couple's marriage
penalty).
90 See H.R. 1453, 106th Cong. § 2 (inserting new section "SEC. 222(a):
DEDUCTION ALLOWED- In the case of a joint return for the taxable year, there shall be
allowed as a deduction an amount..."); S.8, 106th Cong. § 202 (proposing new section
"SEC. 222(a): IN GENERAL- In the case of a joint return under section 6013 for the
taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount..."); S.2147, 105th Cong.
§1 (inserting new section "SEC. 222(a): IN GENERAL- In the case of a joint return under
section 6013 for the taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount...");
S. 1415, 105th Cong. (Daschle Amendment) (proposing new section "SEC. 222(a): IN
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penalty would remain unavailable to any couple in which the spouses
file separately. Paradoxically, spouses who file separately are in even
more need of marriage penalty relief than are jointly filing couples, as
can be ascertained from Graph 2, above. But this need is overlooked
in the two-earner deduction and credit reform proposals. Because the
relief proposals condition the two-earner deduction or credit on the
use of a joint return, they directly exacerbate the incentive to file
91
jointly rather than separately that already exists under current law.
Under any of these proposals, even more married couples would file
jointly than currently do so, and thus, even more couples would find
themselves subject to the regime ofjoint and several liability. 92
2. Proposals offering relief through a direct modification of the rate
structure
Most recent tax reform proposals attempt to provide marriage
penalty relief by altering the rate structure directly. They attempt, in
one manner or another, to redesign tax rates so as to reduce or
eliminate the marriage penalty. Any change in the tax code that alters
the rate structure necessarily changes the relative burdens of joint and
separate returns and, thus, necessarily affects their incidence.
Consequently, amending the rate structure potentially influences the
number of couples to whom joint and several liability will apply.
Unfortunately, virtually all of the proposals of this sort adjust rates in
a way that retains the incentive to file jointly. 93 In fact, many of the
proposals increase the likelihood that a couple will file jointly and be
subject to joint and several liability.9 4 One proposal, however,
reduces the incentive to file jointly for some couples and will be
GENERAL- In the case of a joint return under section 6013 for the taxable year, there shall

be allowed as a deduction an amount..."); H.R. 2593, 105th Cong. § 2 (inserting new
section "SEC. 222(a): DEDUCTION ALLOWED- "In the case of a joint return for the
taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount . . ."); H.R. 1584, 105th
Cong. § 202 (proposing new section "SEC 24A(a): "ALLOWANCE OF CREDIT- In the case
of ajoint return for the taxable year, there shall be allowed as a credit. .
91 See supra Part II.A.

92 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999); see also Christian, supra note 2, at 56.
93See infra Parts IlI.C.2.d, lIl.C.2.f.

94 See infra Parts II.C.2.a-c.
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a) Approach 1: Married couples may choose from among filing
jointly, separately, or as if they were single
One group of relief proposals endeavors to eradicate the
marriage penalty by permitting married spouses to file jointly,
separately, or, in effect, as if the spouses were single. 96 The husband
and wife may select whichever of the three sets of tax rates results in
the lowest tax liability. 97 In this manner, these proposals eliminate the
marriage penalty found in the rate structure by permitting spouses to
select single tax rates if those produce a better result than joint return
rates. Under these proposals, however, marriage bonuses persist for
disparate-income couples.
Troublingly, these proposals would
encourage more couples to file jointly and would subject more
couples to joint and several liability than under current law.
The single filing status option is achieved by offering married
couples the new option of filing a "combined" return in which tax
liability is computed, in effect, as if the two spouses were single. 98 In
each proposal, taxable income is allocated between the spouses in a
manner that approximates their taxable incomes if they were single. 99
See infra Part lll.C.2.e.
96 See Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, 106th Cong. § 201 (1999);
Half and Half: Tax Relief and Debt Reduction Act of 1998, S. 1711, 105th Cong. § 2
(1998); Taxpayer Justice Act of 1997, H.R. 3059, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax
Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R.
2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); H.R. 2462, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
97See S. 1429, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 1711, 105th Cong.
§ 2; H.R. 3059,
105th Cong. § 2; S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R 2462, 105th
Cong. § 2 (proposing use of single-rate filing option and stating in proposed I.R.C. §
6013A(a) "[a] husband and wife may make a combined return of income taxes under
subtitle A under which -.... ").If adopted, new provision 6013A would thus offer a
filing status option in addition to the joint return and the separate return available to
married couples under current law.
98 See supra note 97 (each bill proposing a new, combined return under
proposed § 6013A).
99See S. 1429, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 1711, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 3059,
105th Cong, § 2; S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2462, 105th
Cong. § 2 (containing essentially the following proposed provisions:
§ 6013A(a)(1): "[A] separate taxable income is determined for
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Once these taxable incomes are determined for each spouse, tax
liability is computed in the combined return by applying single rates
each spouse by applying the rules provided in this section
§ 6013A(b):
Treatment of Income. - For purposes of this section (1)earned income (within the meaning of section 911 (d)), and any
income received as a pension or annuity which, arises from an
employer-employee relationship, shall be treated as the income of
the spouse who rendered the services, and
(2) income from property shall be divided between the spouses 'in
accordance with their respective ownership rights in'
such property
(equally in the case of property held jointly by the spouses).,
§ 6013A(c):
Treatment of Deductions. - For purposes of this section
(1) except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the deductions
described in section 62(a) shall be allowed to the spouse treated as
having the income to which such deductions relate,
(2) the deduction for retirement savings described in paragraph (7)
of section 62(a) shall be allowed to the spouse whose earned
income qualified the savings for the deduction,
(3) the deduction for alimony described in paragraph (10) of
section 62(a) shall be allowed to the spouse who has the liability to
pay the alimony,
(4) the deduction described in paragraph (16) of section 62(a)
(relating to contributions to medical savings accounts) shall be
allowed to the spouse with respect to whose employment or selfemployment such account relates,
(5) the deductions allowable by section 151(b) (relating to personal
exemptions for taxpayer and spouse) shall be determined by
allocating I personal exemption to each spouse,
(6) section 63 shall be applied as if such spouses were not married,
except that the election whether or not to itemize deductions shall
be made jointly by both spouses and apply to each, and
(7) each spouse's share of all other deductions shall be determined
by multiplying the aggregate amount thereof by the fraction (A) the numerator of which is such spouse's adjusted
gross income, and
(B) the denominator of which is the combined
adjusted gross incomes of the 2 spouses.
Any fraction determined under paragraph (7) shall be rounded to
the nearest percentage point.
§ 6013A(d): "Treatment of Credits - Credits shall be determined
(and applied against the joint liability of the couple for tax determined under
this section) as if the spouses had filed ajoint return.").
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taxable income, then by adding the two liabilities
to each separate
00
together.'
Under each of the proposals offering married couples the new
is treated as a
unmarried rate filing option, the new, combined return
0
joint return and triggers joint and several liability.' '
Predicting the filing status a couple will elect under this
proposed approach to marriage penalty relief requires an assumption
that the couple will opt for the status that minimizes its combined tax
liability. A reexamination of the pictorial representation of the
competing tax liabilities aids in determining which one of the three
filing statuses does so. The following graph illustrates the three
statuses available to married taxpayers under this class of proposal.

1O0 See S. 1429, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 1711, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 3059,
105th Cong. §2; S. 1314, 105th Cong., § 2; H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2462, 105th
Cong. § 2 (each containing the following proposed provision: § 6013A(a)(2): "[T]he tax
imposed by section I is the aggregate amount resulting from applying the separate rates
set forth in section I(c) [relating to rates applicable to unmarried individuals] to each such
taxable income.").
101 See Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, 106th Cong. § 201 (1999);
Half and Half: Tax Relief and Debt Reduction Act of 1998, S. 1711, 105th Cong. §2
(1998); Taxpayer Justice Act of 1997, H.R. 3059, 105th Cong. §2 (1997); Marriage Tax
Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. §2 (1997); Marrriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R.
2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); H.R. 2462, 105th Cong. §2 (1997) (each containing the
following proposed provision: "(e) Treatment as a Joint Return. - Except as otherwise
provided in this section or in the regulations prescribed hereunder, for purposes of this
title (other than sections 1 and 63(c)) a combined return under this section shall be treated
as a joint return."). Thus, for purposes of I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3), the new, combined return
would be treated as a joint return and would trigger joint and several liability.
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Graph 3.

MFS

unmarried rates)

MFJ & MFS

Combined Return (using
unmarried rates)

The lowest combined tax liability for disparate-income
couples continues to result from the traditional joint return. Thus,
despite the ability to file as if the spouses were single, disparateincome couples will opt instead to file jointly because at disparate
incomes, the traditional joint return generates less tax than do single
tax rates. These couples will continue to experience marriage bonuses
as a result of the rate structure's operation. Once spouses' incomes
converge enough to create a marriage penalty under the joint return,
however, that is, once the combined return or unmarried couple's
liability line dips below the joint return liability line toward the
middle of Graph 3, married couples will stop using the traditional
joint return. Instead, they will switch to the new, combined return to
obtain the benefit of the lower rates that apply to single individuals.
To minimize their tax liabilities, similar-income and equal-income
married couples are likely to choose the new, combined return that
approximates being single, while disparate-income couples will
continue to file the traditional joint return. This likely filing status
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selection is represented on Graph 3 by the heavy line.
The approach to marriage penalty relief that permits married
couples to file as if they were single would, unfortunately, subject
even more couples to the regime of joint and several liability. Under
the proposals, disparate-income couples, as under current law, would
continue to file the traditional joint return and remain subject to joint
and several liability.' 0 2 More alarmingly, similar- and equal-income
couples who currently find it advantageous at times to file separately
due to tax rules outside of the rate structure10 3 would often have an
incentive, because of a somewhat lower tax liability under the
proposed law, to file the new, combined return as if they were single.
Those couples would then become subject to joint and several
liability.' 4 Under the proposed legislation, couples in which spouses'
earnings are close are even more likely than under current law to
choose a filing status that imposes joint and several liability. The
switch by such couples from separate returns to the new, combined
return would deepen the ranks of married couples who are subject to
the injurious joint and several liability regime.
Another aspect of the bills employing this approach to
marriage penalty relief compounds the favored status of the combined
return. The standard deduction assigned to the combined return
further enhances it relative to separate returns. Each of the proposals
assigns a $3,000 standard deduction per individual, or $6,000 per
couple, for those married couples who use the combined return. 10 5 By
102 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
103 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. See also Christian, Liability,
supra note 22, at 602 & n.308; Christian, supra note 6, at 271-72 & nn. 113-14.

104 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.

105 See e.g. S. 1429, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 1711, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R.

3059, 105th Cong. § 2; S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2462,
105th Cong. § 2. With respect to the combined return, subsection (c) of each bill
essentially provides:
Basic Standard Deduction for Unmarried Individuals Made
Applicable. - Subparagraph (C) of section 63(c)(2) is amended to read as
follows:
(C) $3,000 in the case of an individual other than (i) a married individual filing a return which is not a
combined return under section 6013A,
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contrast, a couple filing the traditional joint return remains entitled to
a standard deduction of only $5,000.1°6 Similarly, a couple filing
separately remains entitled to standard deductions of only $2,500 per
return, 10 7 or $5,000 per couple. Because the total standard deduction
under the combined return exceeds that available for couples who file
separately, these proposals further favor the combined return over
separate ones. Because of this aspect of the proposals, even more
couples will file jointly under the new, combined return than
separately and even more couples will be subject to joint and several
liability.0
b) Approach 2: Married couples may choose from among filing
jointly, separately, or under a new, combined return which splits
income using the rates applicable to unmarried couples
One recent bill uses a slightly different approach to eliminate
the marriage penalty that arises from the rate structure. 109 Alarmingly,
this proposal would likely significantly increase the incidence of joint
and several liability. Although this approach retains the traditional
joint return as well as separate returns, it creates a new, combined
return 10 that generates tax liabilities lower than either of those other
(ii) a surviving spouse, or
(iii) a head of household, or ...
The only categories of filers other than those described in parts (i), (ii), and (iii), above,
are individuals filing the new, combined return and single individuals. Thus, each
individual who files a combined return with his or her spouse would be entitled to a
$3,000 standard deduction. Proposed section 6013A(c)(6), stating "section 63 shall be
applied as if such spouses were not married ... [,J" confirms that each spouse would be
entitled to the $3,000 standard deduction. Thus, a couple filing the new, combined return
would be entitled to a combined standard deduction allowance of $6,000. Id.
106 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(A) (1999) ("For purposes of paragraph (I), the basic
standard deduction is... $5,000 in the case of(i) ajoint return.").
107 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(D) (1999) ("For purposes of paragraph (1), the basic
standard deduction is . . . $2,500 in the case of a married individual filing a separate
return.").
108 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
109 See Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1285, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
110 See S. 1285, 105th Cong. § 2 (proposing a new I.R.C. § 6013A resulting
in a new, combined return for married taxpayers).
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options and lower than the rates applicable to unmarried couples. The
proposal essentially creates a new filing status for married couples
under which each spouse is treated as if he or she earned half of the
couple's combined taxable income."'1 The tax rates in place for single
individuals are then applied to those taxable incomes, 1 2 and the two
resulting tax liabilities are then added together." 3 This proposal
essentially uses the concepts of aggregation and income splitting
under which joint rates relate to separate rates to create a new rate
schedule that is related to single rates. Under it, couples are required
to aggregate their incomes on one return. The new applicable tax
rates, however, rise half as quickly as single rates - that is, tax
brackets in the new schedule are twice as wide as the brackets for
unmarried individuals to allow for income splitting. This new,
combined return essentially allows income splitting, but uses single
rates, rather than separate return rates, as a base. Because single rates
are already lower than separate rates, 1 4 the new, combined return
always generates lower tax liabilities than those of the traditional joint
return.
The tax liabilities resulting under the new, combined return

See S. 1285, 105th Cong. § 2 (proposing a new I.R.C. § 6013A providing,

in part:
(a) General Rule. -A husband and wife may make a combined
return of income taxes under subtitle A under which (I) a separate taxable income is determined for each spouse by
applying the rules provided in this section, ...
(b) Determination of Taxable Income. (1) IN GENERAL. -For purposes of subsection (a)(1), the taxable
income for each spouse shall be one-half of the taxable income
computed as if the spouses were filing ajoint return.).
l12 See S. 1285, 105th Congress § 2 (proposing a new I.R.C. § 6013A

providing, in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE. -A husband and wife may make a combined
return of income taxes under subtitle A under which -...
(2) the tax imposed by section I is the aggregate amount resulting

from applying the separate rates set forth in section I(c) [referring
to rates applicable to unmarried individuals] to each such taxable
income.).
113 See id
114 See supra Graph 2.
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also fall below the liabilities for single couples. This bill, therefore,
eliminates the marriage penalty that results from the rate structure. It
exacerbates marriage bonuses, however, allowing all couples to enjoy
larger bonuses.
The relative tax liabilities for the various filing statuses
available under this proposal are illustrated below:
Graph 4.

MFS

Again, predicting which filing status couples will select under
this approach to marriage penalty relief requires an assumption that
spouses choose the status minimizing combined tax liability. As
Graph 4 clearly demonstrates, the new, combined return generates tax
liabilities far below those of the traditional joint return and even
farther below those of separate returns, regardless of the distribution
of earnings between the two spouses. All couples, whether spousal
incomes differ or are similar, would likely select this new, combined
return. This proposed rate structure favors the new, combined return
so much more than separate returns, it is exceedingly unlikely that any
couple would ever find it advantageous to file separately.
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Moreover, this proposal, like those of Approach 1 described
above, adopts a standard deduction which further reinforces the
preference for the combined return relative to separate returns. The
proposal instructs married couples filing the combined return to take a
standard deduction of twice the $3,000 amount available to unmarried
individuals.' 15 Thus, a couple utilizing the combined return would be
entitled to $6,000 in standard deductions. By contrast, married
couples filing jointly or separately would continue to be allowed only
$5,000 per couple. 1 6 Because the aggregate standard deduction under
the combined return exceeds that available for couples who file
separately, these proposals further favor the combined return over
separate ones. Even more couples will file jointly under the new,
combined return than separately because of this aspect of the bill.
Under this proposal, the new, combined return is treated as a
joint return and, therefore, triggers joint and several liability.' 17 As a
result, this proposal would likely increase significantly the number of
couples who would be subject to joint and several liability. Almost all
couples who currently file separately would opt, instead, for the new,
combined return and would find themselves governed by the rule of
joint and several liability." 8

115 See Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1285, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997)
(stating in proposed section 6013A(b)(2):
NONITEMIZERS - For purposes of paragraph (I) [relating to the
determination of taxable income for each spouse], if an election
is made not to itemize deductions for any taxable year, the basic
standard deduction shall be equal to the amount which is twice
the basic standard deduction under section 63(c)(2)(C) [relating
to the standard deduction for unmarried individuals] for the
taxable year.).
116 See supra notes 106-07.
117 See S. 1285, 105th § 2 (stating in proposed section 6013A(d):
"TREATMENT As JOINT RETURN. - Except as otherwise provided in this section or in the
regulations prescribed hereunder, for purposes of this title (other than sections I and
63(c)) a combined return under this section shall be treated as a joint return)."). Thus, for
purposes of I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3), the new, combined return would be treated as a joint
return and would precipitate joint and several liability. Id.

118 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
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c) Approach 3: Joint return rates are reduced so they represent
the income splitting result using unmarried rates as a base
Recently proposed is a variation of Approach 2, described
above. Like Approach 2, this reform proposal would significantly
increase the number of couples who would find themselves subject to
joint and several liability. Rather than adding a new, combined return,
this third method' 19 to eliminate the marriage penalty would reduce
the rates for the traditional joint return until they matched those of the
combined return in Approach 2, above. Thus, two filing statuses
would be available to married couples as opposed to three in
Approach 2, above. Yet the joint return would generate tax bills
identical to those of the combined return introduced above. More
precisely, this proposal requires the brackets for joint rates to be twice
as wide as the brackets for rates applicable to unmarried
individuals. 120 By the time these new joint rates would be fully
phased in, the rate structure would appear as follows:

119 American Values Tax Savings Plan for the 21st Century, H.R. 2350,
106th Cong. § 102 (1999).
120 See H.R. 2350, 106th Cong. § 102(a) (providing in proposed section

1(0(8):
In prescribing the table
under paragraph (1) which applies in lieu of the table contained
in subsection (a) [referring to joint return tax brackets and rates]
with respect to taxable years beginning in a calendar year after
2004, the minimum and maximum dollar amounts for each rate
bracket shall be twice the minimum and maximum dollar
amounts (respectively) prescribed by the Secretary under this
subsection for the comparable rate bracket under subsection (c)
[referring to rates and brackets applicable to unmarried
individuals] for such taxable years.).
ELIMINATION OF MARRIAGE PENALTY. -
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Graph 5.
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This rate structure eliminates the marriage penalty while
retaining, indeed, increasing marriage bonuses. More alarmingly, this
rate structure makes the joint return even more attractive relative to
separate returns than it is under current law. As in Approach 2, above,
not only would disparate-income couples retain an incentive to file
jointly, but similar-income couples who for reasons unrelated to the
rate structure occasionally favor the separate return,' 21 would have a
greater incentive to adopt the joint return instead. Undoubtedly, more
couples than under current law would file jointly. More couples,
consequently, would
find themselves subject to the law of joint and
122
several liability.
d) Approach 4: Separate return rates and unmarried rates are
made equivalent
A fourth group of marriage penalty relief proposals fails to
reduce the incidence of the joint return and of joint and several
121 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

122 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
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liability. These bills eliminate the rate structure's marriage penalty

simply by equating the rates that apply to separately filing married
couples with those applicable to single taxpayers.1 23 Under these
proposals, joint return rates still relate to separate return rates through

the concepts of income splitting and aggregation.

Thus, joint rates

compare to single rates in the same manner. The rate brackets for the
124

joint return are twice as wide as those for separate or single returns.

Graph 6, below, illustrates the relationship among the rates for the

three filing statuses.
Graph 6.
DI

El

MFJ

The graph demonstrates that under this approach to marriage
penalty relief, the rates no longer cause a marriage penalty for any
couple, regardless of the distribution of earnings between the two

spouses. Joint return liabilities never exceed those of single couples.
123Top Ten Terrible Tax Act of 1999, H.R. 2414, 106th Cong.
§ 5(a) (1999);
Marriage Tax Elimination Act of 1999, H.R. 6, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); Marriage Tax
Penalty Elimination Act of 1999, S. 12, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); Marriage Tax Penalty
Elimination Act of 1998, H.R. 3734, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); Marriage Tax Penalty
Elimination Act of 1998, S. 1999, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); Gephardt 10 Percent Tax Act
of 1998, H.R. 3620, 105th Cong. § 101 (1998).
124 See generally supra note 123. For each bill compare proposed I.R.C. §

I(a) containing joint return brackets with proposed I.R.C. § I(c) containing the brackets
advanced both for married separate filers and for single individuals.
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All couples except those in which spouses' incomes are identical,
however, experience a marriage bonus.
The effect of this approach on a married couple's selection of
filing status is easily discerned from Graph 6, above. As under the
current system, joint returns continue to produce a lower liability than
separate returns for all but equal-income married couples. Thus, as
under current law, 125 the vast majority of couples will have an
incentive to file jointly rather than separately. As for equal-income
couples, they will continue to be indifferent between the joint and
separate returns. Under this fourth approach to eliminating the rate
structure marriage penalty, most couples will continue to use the joint
return, and thus,126most will continue to be vulnerable to joint and
several liability.
e) Approach 5: Separate return rates and unmarried rates are
made equivalent but joint liabilities increase for upper-income
couples
Interestingly, under a fifth approach to marriage penalty relief,
a few couples would be encouraged to abandon the joint return and
file separately, thereby, avoiding joint and several liability.
Unfortunately, this incentive would apply to too few couples; the vast
majority would continue to file jointly and would remain under the
regime of joint and several liability. This fifth approach 127 is similar
to the one just described for families with combined taxable incomes
up to and including $102,300. For those couples, separate rates are
made equivalent to those of single individuals, 128 and joint rates may
be derived from either through income splitting and aggregation.
Again, the rate brackets for joint returns, up to the $102,300 combined
income level, are twice as wide as those for separate returns and single

125 See supra Part H.A.
126 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
127 See Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 3151, 105th Cong. § 3

(1998).

128 See id. (proposing amendment to I.R.C. § 1(c) resulting in new rate

schedule applicable to both single individuals and married separate filers).
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returns. 129 Thus, for those couples, marriage bonuses persist, marriage
penalties are eliminated, and joint returns remain more attractive than
separate ones. 130 Consequently, most couples in this income range

will select
the joint return and will be subject to joint and several
131
liability.
For couples with combined taxable incomes above $102,300,
the joint return tax brackets are less than twice as wide as the brackets
applicable to similar separate filers. 132 Income splitting is only

partially available. As a consequence, the joint return liability for a
couple whose combined taxable income exceeds $102,300 would
exceed what income splitting would have produced. Since the joint

return brackets are less than twice as wide as those for separate filers,
income gets pushed into higher rate bracketsfaster than it would have
under the income splitting system. More income is subjected to the
higher rate brackets, and as a result, joint return liability is greater

than it would have been had income splitting been wholly available.
For a couple with combined taxable income of slightly more
than $102,300, the relative tax liabilities for disparate- and similarincome couples would appear as follows:

129 See id. Compare proposed § 1(a) up to income level of $102,300,
containing joint return brackets, with proposed § 1(c) up to income level of $51,150,
containing the brackets advanced both for married separate filers and for single
individuals.
130 See supra Graph 6. Of course, joint returns are more attractive than
separate ones only for those couples with combined taxable incomes up to $102,300 for
whom spouses' incomes are not exactly identical. For equal-income couples, separate
returns are as attractive as joint returns.
131See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
132 See Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 3151, 105th Cong. §3
(1998). Compare proposed I.R.C. § l(a) above income level of $102,300, containing
joint return brackets, with proposed I.R.C. § l(c) above income level of $51,150,
containing the brackets proposed for married separate filers and single taxpayers.
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Graph 7.
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With regard to the goal of marriage neutrality, this rate

structure retains marriage bonuses for disparate-income couples, but
eliminates the marriage penalty for similar- or equal-income couples.
Those equal-income couples for whom the joint return liability
exceeds the tax bill for an unmarried couple will file separately when
married, thus, incurring no more liability than if they remained single.
They experience neither a marriage penalty nor a marriage bonus.
Interestingly, the larger a couple's combined taxable income
under this approach, the less tax savings is available by filing jointly
since a greater portion of the couple's income falls within the range in
which income splitting is not wholly available. Thus, the larger the
combined income for the couple, the higher the joint return liability,
the closer that liability is to the higher end of the separate liability
range, and the farther it is from the low end of the separate liability
range. Thus, for a couple with combined taxable income greatly
exceeding $102,300, the relative tax liabilities for disparate- and
similar-income couples would appear as shown below:

346

N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVI

Graph 8.
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At this income level, most married couples neither suffer a
marriage penalty nor enjoy a marriage bonus. Most would file
separately and experience true marriage neutrality. Only couples with
extremely divergent incomes would continue to experience a marriage
bonus, but none would incur a marriage penalty.
Under Approach 5, the likelihood of filing jointly changes as
the income level rises above $102,300. A couple in which combined
income only slightly exceeds $102,300 would likely file jointly unless
spousal incomes were very similar.' 33 If spousal incomes were close
to identical, however, the proposed rate structure would actually
134
encourage a couple at this combined income level to file separately.
For the first time since 1948, the rate structure would affirmatively
encourage some couples, albeit only similar-income couples, to file in
a manner under which they would not be exposed to the regime of
joint and several liability.
133

See supra Graph 7.

134 See id.
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The higher the couple's combined income level, the more the
spouses' incomes can diverge before the couple loses the incentive to
file separately. As can be observed from Graph 8, above, couples in
which spouses' incomes diverge significantly continue to generate a
lower tax liability by filing jointly than by filing separately. However,
most couples across the spectrum of the diagram, that is, couples in
which incomes diverge somewhat and couples in which incomes are
similar or equal, benefit more from filing separately than jointly. At
extremely high income levels, the instant rate structure actually
encourages perhaps a significant number of couples to file separately.
Many couples at this income level would be able to file in a manner
that precludes the application of joint and several liability. Of course,
the number of couples at such high income levels and in which
spousal incomes are similar or somewhat divergent may not be very
large.
Although this proposal does encourage certain married
couples to file separately and thereby avoid joint and several liability,
it is too small a step in the right direction. As demonstrated above,
this benefit is limited to a relatively small portion of the American
married population. It is limited to couples in which combined
taxable incomes exceed $102,300, and even then only to couples on
the right side of the graph, those with similar incomes. Although a
few couples under this approach would be encouraged to file
separately, far too many couples would retain the incentive to file
jointly. Far too many would35remain endangered by the onerous joint
and several liability system.'
f) Approach 6: Joint and separate return rates remain unchanged,
but single rates act differently at different levels of combined
income
In another proposal for marriage penalty relief, 136 joint and
separate rates remain as they are under current law. Consequently,
this proposal does nothing to reduce the use of the joint return or the
135 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
136 See Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 767, 106th Cong. § 3

(1999).
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incidence of joint' and several liability. Under this proposal, joint
37
brackets are twice as wide as those of the separate rate schedule.
Here, income splitting is present in the rate structure for all combined
income levels. This proposal addresses the marriage penalty, then, by
adjusting the rates applicable to unmarried taxpayers.
Under this bill, the rates applicable to unmarried individuals
are identical to separate return rates for couples with combined
taxable incomes up to and including $52,025.'
Thus, tax liabilities
for unmarried couples and for married ones who file separately appear
as below:
Graph 9.
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Graph 9 confirms that within the $52,025 combined income
range, this proposal eliminates the marriage penalty found in the rate
structure, but it retains marriage bonuses for all but equal-income
couples.
For couples With combined incomes above $52,025, the rate
brackets for single taxpayers are wider than those for married separate
137 See id. Compare proposed § I(a) containing joint return brackets with

proposed I.R.C. § I(d) constituting the tax brackets for married separate filers.
138 See H.R. 767, 106th Cong. § 3. Compare proposed I.R.C. § 1(c) up to
income level of $52,025, containing rate brackets for single filers, with proposed I.R.C. §
I(d) up to $52,025 income level, providing rate brackets for married separate filers. The
two schedules depart from each other above the $52,025 taxable income level.
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filers. 139 Thus, for any individual with taxable income exceeding
$52,025, tax liability as a single
individual would be less than under
40
the married separate return.
Single tax liabilities and separate return liabilities begin to
differ from each other over the range of combined taxable income
from just over $52,025 up to and including $104,050. Whether the
two rates are equivalent or generate different tax liabilities within this
range depends on whether the spouse being taxed is part of a similarincome couple or a disparate-income couple. To elaborate, whenever
a spouse earns more than $52,025 of taxable income, the separate
141
return rate schedule pushes that spouse into the 31% bracket,
whereas the single rate schedule imposes a marginal tax rate of only
28%.142 For such an individual, the single filing status would produce
a better result than would the separate return. The superiority of
single rates over separate return rates occurs for different couples
depending on their distribution of earnings along the range of
combined incomes from $52,026 through $104,050.
For couples with a combined income of $52,026, only at the
most disparate earning pattern, $52,026 for one spouse and no
earnings for the other spouse, can the first spouse earn more than
$52,025 and be pushed from the 28% bracket as a single taxpayer into
the 31% bracket as a separate filer. Single return liability is more
advantageous than the separate return result at this income level, but
only for the most disparately earning of couples. For other couples
across the earnings-distribution spectrum, the single return generates
139 See H.R. 767, 106th Cong. §3. Compare proposed I.R.C. § I(c) above
$52,025 income level, brackets for single filers, with proposed I.R.C. §1(d) above
$52,025 income level, brackets for married separate filers.
140 Tax liability as a single individual would be less than that for a married
separate filer because as income rises the narrower brackets under the separate return
would push income into higher tax brackets faster than it would under the wider brackets
for single taxpayers. See H.R. 767, 106th Cong. § 3(a) (proposed I.R.C. §§ I(c) & (d)).
141 See id (proposing amendment to I.R.C. §l(d) containing brackets for
married separate filers) ("If taxable income is: Over $52,025 but not over $79,275[,]
[then] [t]he tax is: $10,017, plus 31% of the excess over $52,025.") (emphasis added).
142 See id (proposing amendment to I.R.C. § 1(c) containing brackets for
unmarried individuals) ("If taxable income is: Over $35,000 but not over $62,450[,]
[then] [tihe tax is: $5,250, plus 28% of the excess over $35,000.") (emphasis added).
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liability equivalent to that under the separate return.
represented below:

43

This result is

Graph 10.
El
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At somewhat higher levels of combined taxable income, one
spouse would be able earn more than $52,025, thereby causing a
difference between the tax liabilities generated under the separate
return and single rates, 144 in more than merely those cases of complete

spousal income disparity. Because combined income would be higher
in this instance, one spouse could have taxable income above $52,025
143 The single return liability is the same as the separate return liability for

these other couples because in their cases, no spouse earns more than $52,025. Under
either rate schedule, single or separate, the highest marginal rate that could apply to
anyone would be 28%. The 31% rate from the separate return schedule would never be
triggered because no one earns more than $52,025. See H.R. 767, 106th Cong. § 3(a)
(proposed I.R.C. §§ i(c) & (d)).
144 By earning more than $52,025 a spouse would fall in the 31% bracket by
filing separately versus experiencing a 28% marginal rate as a single taxpayer. See H.R.
767, 106th Cong. § 3(a) (proposed I.R.C. §§ 1(c) & (d)).
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even if the other spouse had some earnings-of her own, that is, even if
incomes were not completely disparate. The relative tax liabilities for
disparate- and similar-income couples whose combined income is
somewhat higher than $52,025 appears below:
Graph 11.
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The greater the level of combined taxable income, the greater
would be the number of couples across the earnings-distribution
continuum that would benefit from filing as single taxpayers rather
than married separate filers. When combined income levels reach
$104,050, one spouse will necessarily earn more than $52,025, and
thus be subject to a 31% bracket in the separate return versus a 28%
bracket in the single return. This statement would be true for all
145
couples except those in which spouses' incomes are exactly equal.
For all but equal-income couples, therefore, single rates would
generate a lower tax liability than would rates under the separate
145 At $104,050, neither spouse would earn more than $52,025 if incomes are

distributed equally. Rather, each spouse would earn exactly $52,025, and both would fall
into the 28% bracket whether they file separately or as single individuals.

(proposed I.R.C. §§ I(c) & (d)).

See id.
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return at this combined income level. This pattern is depicted below:
Graph 12.
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Notice that during the range of combined incomes from
$52,025 to $104,050, marriage penalties do not exist. Marriage
bonuses, however, are available to all but equal-income married
couples.
When combined taxable income exceeds $104,050, at least
one spouse will always earn more than $52,025. Such is the case for
every couple, regardless of the distribution of earnings between
spouses. 146 Thus, at combined income levels above $104,050, single
rates will produce a lower tax liability than separate returns for all
couples across the continuum. Joint rates continue to relate to
separate rates through income splitting and aggregation. This pattern
appears below:
146 Even equal-income couples must contain a spouse earning more than

$52,025 if combined income exceeds $104,050. If combined income is $104,051, for
example, the spouses in an equal-income couple would each earn $52,025.50 and would
each be pushed into the 31% bracket filing separately rather than the 28% bracket that
would apply if they were single. See Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 767,
106th Cong. § 3(a) (proposed I.R.C. §§ 1(c) & (d)).
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Graph 13.
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Single

Once again, a marriage bonus is present for most couples.
Furthermore, as the graph demonstrates, at combined income levels
above $104,050, a marriage penalty reemerges for similar-income
couples.
As combined income levels increase even more, the single
return liabilities become more and more advantageous relative to
separate return liabilities. The advantage for unmarried couples
results because at incomes above $52,025 per individual or $104,050
per couple, the single rate brackets become wider than those of the
separate return schedule. 47 As combined incomes rise further and
further above $104,050 per couple, income gets pushed into higher
brackets slowly for unmarried couples, but more quickly for married
separate filers. Essentially, the rates for single individuals are flatter
than those for separate filers. As combined income increases, a
147

See H.R. 767, 106th Cong.

Compare proposed I.R.C. § l(c) above

income level of $52,025, containing brackets for unmarried individuals, with proposed
I.R.C. § l(d) above income level of $52,025, containing brackets for married separate
filers.
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greater portion of that income falls in the portion of the rate schedules
which favor single taxpayers over married separate filers. As a result,
the single liability line moves lower relative to the separate return
liability line. Graph 14, below, illustrates how the single liability line
would drop relative to the separate return liability when combined
income greatly exceeds $104,050.
Graph 14.

As combined incomes rise, more and more couples experience
marriage
penalty. Only the disparate-income couple retains its
a
advantageous marriage bonus.
Regardless of how single rates behave in the different
combined income ranges, joint and separate rates continue to be
related to each other throughout all income levels through income
splitting and aggregation. 148 The joint return thus generates a lower
tax liability than do separate returns for all couples except those in
which incomes are exactly equal. Thus, most couples will continue to
choose the joint return under this approach to marriage penalty relief.
Unfortunately, most will continue to be subject to joint and several
148 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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149

IV. CONCLUSION.

Amending the tax code to solve one problem, the marriage
penalty, can have unintended consequences of which Congress and
the public should be aware. Correcting one flaw may actually
increase the incidence of other hidden concerns, in this case joint and
several liability. For those taxpayers against whom the IRS asserts
joint and several liability, that regime is potentially much more
financially devastating than the traditional marriage penalties would
have been. Joint and several liability exposes a non-delinquent spouse
to potentially unlimited liability, 50 whereas, the marriage penalty
creates a fixed and usually relatively inexpensive charge. 5' Thus, the
See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
150 The potential cost of joint and several liability to the non-delinquent
spouse is limited only by the amount of the deficiency, interest, and penalties the IRS
decides to assert against her. Cases exist in which the IRS has sought payment from the
non-delinquent spouse even though the tax deficiency exceeded her means manyfold. See
e.g., Kathy M. Kristof, Taxpayer Stuck in IRS'Narrow Escape Clause, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
20, 1996, at D2 (describing a case in which the IRS sought from a woman payment of her
ex-husband's tax deficiency, ten years of interest, and penalties although her sole source
of support was a meager monthly social security check and income from a modest IOU).
151 The marriage penalty caused by the rate structure may amount to a small
portion of a couple's combined taxable income. For example, a couple in which one
spouse earns $80,000 and the other earns $40,000 would experience a marriage penalty
from the rate structure of just over $1,000, or less than 1% of combined taxable income.
See Christian, supra note 6, at 276 tbl.3. The marriage penalty does not always constitute
such a small portion of a couple's combined income, however. In fact, the marriage
penalty arising in connection with the EITC can amount to an extremely high percentage
of income. See Ellen E. Schultz, Living in Sin to Cut Tax Bill Would Look Even Better to
Some Under Clinton Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1993, at CI "Calculations prepared for
The Wall Street Journal by KPMG Peat Marwick show that the marriage penalty has the
greatest impact on the lowest wage earners with children." Id. As a percentage of
income, the EITC marriage penalty is among the largest imposed in the tax system. See
Brown, supra note 45, at 1479; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF OBRA-93, at 37-40 (1994). In some cases the marriage penalty
for low-income taxpayers is estimated to be as high as 9% of total gross income. See
Middle-Income Tax Proposals: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 104th
Cong. 48 (1995) (statement of Deborah H. Schenk); Alstott, supra note 45, at 562;
Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for Low-Income Taxpayers: Some Options, 57
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*cure and its increased incidence of joint and several liability may be
worse, as a policy matter, than the original illness the marriage
penalty presents.
In fact, joint and several liability can be viewed as a sort of
marriage penalty in itself in that it is imposed only on taxpayers who
have married. 52 It does not apply to single taxpayers. It does not
apply to married separate filers either. Nevertheless, because the tax

system is structured to impose an overwhelming incentive on married
couples to file jointly rather than separately,153 marrying almost
guarantees joint filing 54 and the applicability of joint and several
liability.55
In addressing the traditional sources of the marriage penalty,

Congress has failed to repeal this other potentially more severe
marriage penalty - joint and several liability.' 56

In fact, as this

Article demonstrates, most of Congress' proposals for marriage
penalty relief would actually aggravate the marriage penalty of joint

and several liability by increasing its prevalence. Most approaches to
marriage penalty relief would cause this other penalty of marriage to
apply to even more couples than under current law by making the

OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 184 (1996); McCaffery, supra note 3, at 995, 1015-16; Zelenak, supra
note 3, at 364.
152
See Symposium, supra note 1, at 167, 196 (comments of Richard C.E.
Beck); Amy C. Christian, Lurking MarriagePenalty, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1999, at A] 4.
Ironically, joint and several liability penalizes marriage in a second way, too. When a
rule is enforced against one spouse because of the other's tax deficiency,.the best option
may be for the couple to divorce. See Christian, supra note 2, at 49. The divorcing
spouses then may utilize a much fairer system, proportional liability, provided they meet
certain requirements. See I.R.C. § 6015(a)(2) and (c) (1999). Under proportional
liability, each spouse can be held liable only for taxes resulting from his or her own
income and deductions, not for taxes created by the errors and omissions of the other
spouse. See id. Proportional liability is not available, however, to couples who stay
married. See id. Paradoxically, by treating divorcing couples more fairly than those who
remain married, our current tax system encourages divorce and penalizes marriage.
153 See supra Part II.A.
154 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
155 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999).
156 None of the marriage penalty proposals introduced in Congress would
repeal I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3), the provision imposing joint and several liability on joint
filers.
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joint return relatively more attractive than it already is.
Congress should address the marriage penalty, but it should do

so in a manner that avoids exacerbating other problems. It could
accomplish this dual goal by simultaneously enacting marriage
penalty relief and repealing joint and several liability. 157 In that case,
marriage penalty relief could never expose more couples to joint and
several liability even if it did encourage more to file jointly.
Should Congress decline to repeal joint and several liability, it
could avoid intensifying its prevalence by making marriage penalty
relief available not solely for joint filers but also for those spouses
who file separately.' 158 In the case of the marriage penalty that results
from the rate structure, Congress could enact marriage penalty relief
that also makes separate return rates more advantageous than under
current law. As legislators fashion a solution to the unpopular
marriage penalty, they should safeguard their constituents from the
harmful and unintended consequences found in most previous
approaches.

157 Both the ABA and the AICPA have recommended the repeal ofjoint and
several liability. In February of 1995, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the
following resolution:
RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recommends to
the Congress that sections 6013(d) and' (e) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 be repealed (i) to eliminate joint and
several liability of a taxpayer who has signed a joint return with
his or her spouse for tax on income properly attributable to his or
her spouse, (ii) to substitute separate liability for tax shown to be
due on the'joint return, and (iii) to repeal innocent spouse relief
from liability for tax on the joint return when the liability arises
from erroneous items of the taxpayer's spouse.
ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Domestic Relations Comm., Comments on Liability of Divorced
Spouses for Tax Deficiencies on Previously Filed Joint Returns, reprinted in 50 TAX
LAW. 395, 395 (1997). In comments submitted to the IRS, the AICPA also recommended
repealing joint and several liability, or in the alternative, eliminating joint returns
altogether. See Ken Rankin, AICPA Advises IRS on Fairer Divorce Procedures, ACCT.
TODAY, July 29, 1996, at 8, available in 1996 WL 8970070. Congress has declined to
eliminate joint and several liability, however. See I.R.C. §§ 6013(d)(3) and 6015 (1999)
(retaining the regime ofjoint and several liability).
158 For example, in the case of the two-earner deduction or credit, Congress
could enact a version that does not condition the availability of the tax benefit upon use of
the joint return. I.e., such a deduction or credit could be made available to separate filers.

